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Abstract
Motivated by Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006), we consider games
with a continuum of players and intermediate preferences. We show that any
such game has a Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the set of at-
tributes into a bounded number of convex sets with the following property:
all players with an attribute in the interior of the same element of the parti-
tion play the same action. We then use this result to show that all sufficiently
large, equicontinuous games with intermediate preferences have an approximate
equilibrium with the same property.
Our result on behavior conformity for large finite game generalizes Theorem
3 of Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) by allowing both a wider class of
preferences and a more general attribute space.
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1 Introduction
Consider an individual who lives in the suburbs of a large city and who can only
reach her office in the city center by driving over one of two bridges. While the
choice of which bridge to take depends on attributes such as her home and office
locations and how pleasant either route may be, it also depends on the choice of all
others driving to the center, namely through their influence on the congestion of the
two bridges. In this example, it is conceivable that equilibrium behavior displays
individuals with similar attributes choosing the same bridge. Such equilibrium can
be interpreted as displaying behavioral conformity in the sense that it induces a
partition of the individuals into a small number of societies (two in the example) of
similar individuals making the same choice.
Conformity to social norms can play an important role in the analysis of public
policies. In fact, Rege (2004) considers the provision of a public good and shows that
no government intervention is needed provided that society members conform with
a social norm for voluntary contributions to it. Moreover, she also shows that the
public policy may have a significant influence on which social normal that individual
conform to.
The above form of conformity has been introduced and rationalized by Wooders,
Cartwright, and Selten (2006) (hereafter WCS). In particular, for games where each
player’s payoff depends only on his choice and on the average choice of the others,
they have shown that if preferences depend continuously on individual attributes,
then for all ε > 0, all sufficiently large games have an ε – equilibrium that induces a
partition of players into a small number of societies relative to the number of players
(Theorem 2). They also show that, if the dependence of preferences on individual
attributes is linear, then the bound on the number of societies required for conformity
3
to hold is independent of ε (Theorem 3).
In order to clarify the essential elements needed for behavioral conformity, in this
paper we extend the framework of WCS among several dimensions. In particular, we
allow for preferences that do not satisfy the continuity and linearity assumptions, we
consider a stronger notion of behavioral conformity, and we allow for a continuum of
players.
Our results rely on the notion of quasi-intermediate preferences, which is obtained
by dropping the continuity requirement of intermediate preferences, introduced in
Grandmont (1978). In games with a continuum of players these preferences allow us
to obtain the existence of a Nash equilibrium displaying behavioral conformity in the
following sense: all players in the “interior” of a society play the same action and the
number of societies is bounded by the number of actions being played. Furthermore,
it allows us to obtain the existence of a Nash equilibrium displaying strong behavioral
conformity (where all players in a society, including those in its boundary, play the
same action) when the game is dispersed (i.e., when the distribution on the attribute
space is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure). These two
results are then used to obtain similar results for games with a large, but finite
number of players.
Our approach allow us to show that the conclusions of Theorem 3 in WCS can be
reached under weaker restrictions on the attribute space and on players’ preferences:
the attribute space can be any bounded, convex and (Borel) measurable subset of RL,
and the function assigning preferences to players need only be measurable, satisfy the
quasi-intermediate property and have an equicontinuous image.1
The main advantage of focusing on games with a continuum of players with quasi-
intermediate preferences is conceptual. Indeed, it clarifies the essential elements
1We note that no attempt to generalize Theorem 2 in WCS is made in this paper.
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needed for behavioral conformity and allows for simple, constructive proofs that can
be used to construct equilibria displaying behavioral conformity in applications.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we introduce the notation and
main definitions. In Section 3, we present our main results concerning behavioral
conformity in games with quasi-intermediate preferences. In Section 4, we explain
how to extend our main results to the case where an attribute can be decomposed
into a crowding type and a taste type. Section 4 also presents results regarding strong
behavioral conformity and the proofs of our main results. Some concluding remarks
are in Section 5. Finally, the Appendix contains the proof of the lemmas.
2 Notation and Definitions
In this section, we present the classes of games and the equilibrium concepts we
consider.
2.1 Pregames and Induced Games
We focus on games that are derived from pregames as in WCS. In all cases, we
assume that each player’s preferences depend on her action and on the distribution of
actions chosen by all players, which corresponds to the global interaction property of
WCS. Throughout the paper, A denotes a finite set of actions, M denotes the set of
probability measures on A and U denotes the set of continuous functions u : A×M→
R. The space U is endowed with the sup norm, which makes U a complete, separable
metric space. Since A is finite,M can be identified with the standard unit simplex in
R|A|, and so we endowM with the sup norm. Furthermore, we sometimes represent a
probability measure µ ∈M by the vector µ = (µ1, . . . , µ|A|), where A = {a1, . . . , a|A|}
and µi = µ({ai}) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |A|.
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A pregame consists of a particular description of the primitive elements of games.
Indeed, it is defined by an action space, by an attribute space and by a preference
function, associating a payoff function to every attribute; hence, in order to obtain
a game from a pregame, one has simply to associate an attribute to every player.
Formally, a pregame G is described by a bounded, convex, Borel measurable attribute
space Ω ⊆ RL, L ≥ 1, a finite action space A, and a Borel measurable preference
function U : Ω → U .2 We denote such a pregame by G = (Ω, U,A). Note that the
measurability assumption on U replaces the continuity in the attributes assumption
of WCS.
We can obtain games from pregames by making explicit the set of players. Since
the pregame already lists the set of actions and the preferences associated with each
attribute, a game induced by a pregame (an induced game, for short) is defined by
any function assigning an attribute to every player. Formally, an induced game is
described by a set T of players, a measure ϕ on T describing the relative weight
of players, a measurable attribute function α : T → Ω assigning an attribute to
each player and a pregame G˜ = (Ω, U, A). Thus, we represent such a game by
G = (T, ϕ, α,Ω, U, A). Clearly, these elements allow us to define a game in the usual
way, by listing its (measure space of) players (T, ϕ), their action space A, and their
payoff function, here defined by the measurable function U ◦ α that assigns payoff
functions to players.
We consider two classes of induced games, which are classified according to the
measure space of players. An induced game with a continuum of players is an induced
game G = (T, ϕ, α,Ω, U,A) satisfying T = [0, 1] and ϕ = `, where ` denotes the
Lebesgue measure. That is, the set of players is the unit interval endowed with the
Lebesgue measure. Similarly, for all n ∈ N, an induced game with n players is an
2Throughout the paper, measurable will be understood to indicate Borel measurable.
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induced game G = (T, ϕ, α,Ω, U, A) where the set of players is a finite set with n
elements endowed with the uniform measure. Formally, let Tn = {1, . . . , n} and νn
be the uniform measure on Tn (i.e., νn satisfies νn({t}) = 1/n for all t ∈ Tn). Then,
G is an induced game with n players if T = Tn and ϕ = νn.
2.2 Equilibrium Concepts
We start by defining strategies, which are (measurable) functions from players into ac-
tions (e.g., Schmeidler (1973)). Thus, a strategy in an induced game G = (T, ϕ, α,Ω, U, A)
is a measurable function f : T → A. Of course, if T is finite, then the measurability
requirement is trivially satisfied.
The definition of equilibrium for induced games depends on whether an induced
game has a continuum of players. The main difference lies in the fact that if there is
a continuum of players, the action of a single player has no impact on the distribution
of actions. Therefore, a strategy is a Nash equilibrium if all players are choosing an
optimal action given the induced distribution on the set of actions. Formally, a Nash
equilibrium of an induced game G = ([0, 1], `, α,Ω, U,A) with a continuum of players
is a strategy f such that
Uα(t)(f(t), ` ◦ f−1) ≥ Uα(t)(a, ` ◦ f−1) (1)
for all a ∈ A and all t ∈ [0, 1].
In contrast to games with a continuum of players, with a finite number of players
each player’s choice affects the distribution of actions. Given a strategy f in an
induced game G with n players, a ∈ A and t¯ ∈ T , let f \t¯ a be the function defined
by:
f \t¯ a(t) =
 a if t = t¯,f(t) if t 6= t¯. (2)
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In words, f \t¯ a is the strategy that results if player t¯ changes his action from f(t¯) to
a, which in turn changes the distribution on A from νn ◦ f−1 to νn ◦ (f \t¯ a)−1.
Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy f is an ε – equilibrium of an induced game G = (Tn, νn, α,Ω, U, A)
with n players if
Uα(t)(f(t), νn ◦ f−1) ≥ Uα(t)(a, νn ◦ (f \t a)−1)− ε (3)
for all t ∈ Tn and all a ∈ A.
3 Behavioral Conformity with Quasi-Intermediate
Preferences
In this section, we present our main results concerning behavioral conformity. We
show that if players’ preferences in a induced game with a continuum of players satisfy
some convexity properties, then every distribution over the set of actions induced by
a Nash equilibrium can be obtained by a Nash equilibrium displaying behavioral
conformity. Thus, every statistical image of the play of such a game — provided by
the distribution over the actions — can be understood as a consequence of behavioral
conformity by the players.
The notion of behavioral conformity we use is the one considered by WCS in
their Theorem 3. For every strategy f , let A(f) = {a ∈ A : f−1(a) 6= ∅} be the
set of actions that are played by some player. A strategy f in an induced game
G displays behavioral conformity if there exists a partition of Ω into |A(f)| convex
subsets {Ca}a∈A(f) such that α−1(int(Ca)) ⊆ f−1(a) for all a ∈ A(f). That is, f
displays behavioral conformity if α(t) ∈ int(Ca) implies f(t) = a for all t ∈ T and
a ∈ A(f). Two important aspects of the definition are worth emphasizing. First, only
pure strategies are considered. Second, referring to each α−1(Ca), with a ∈ A(f), as
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a society, the definition of behavioral conformity requires the strategy f to induce a
partition of the space of players into |A(f)| societies. Hence, under our definition,
if f displays behavioral conformity, then the number of societies is bounded by the
number of actions.
Our results require the following form of convexity of preferences, which corre-
sponds to a generalization of the notion of intermediate preferences, introduced by
Grandmont (1978): The preference u is between u1 and u2 if for all µ ∈ M, a and
a¯ ∈ A,
(1) u1(a, µ) ≥ u1(a¯, µ) and u2(a, µ) ≥ u2(a¯, µ) implies u(a, µ) ≥ u(a¯, µ);
(2) u1(a, µ) > u1(a¯, µ) and u2(a, µ) > u2(a¯, µ) implies u(a, µ) > u(a¯, µ);
(3) [u1(a, µ) = u1(a¯, µ) and u2(a, µ) > u2(a¯, µ)] or [u1(a, µ) > u1(a¯, µ) and u2(a, µ) =
u2(a¯, µ)] implies u(a, µ) > u(a¯, µ).
Then, the family of preferences U(Ω) is quasi-intermediate if for all ω, ω¯ ∈ Ω and
γ ∈ (0, 1), Uω˜ is between Uω and Uω¯ where ω˜ = γω + (1− γ)ω¯.
Note that this definition generalizes Grandmont’s notion of intermediate prefer-
ences, since it does not require the set {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a, µ) ≥ Uω(a¯, µ)} to be closed in
Ω, for every a and a¯ in A and all µ ∈M. Furthermore, it follows from Example 3 in
Grandmont (1978) that it also generalizes the linearity in the taste types assumption
of WCS.
The following theorem is our behavioral conformity result for this class of prefer-
ences in induced games with a continuum of players.
Theorem 1 Let G = ([0, 1], `, α,Ω, U,A) be an induced game with a continuum of
players such that U(Ω) is quasi-intermediate. Then, for every Nash equilibrium g
of G, there exists a Nash equilibrium f of G that displays behavioral conformity and
satisfies ` ◦ f−1 = ` ◦ g−1.
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Theorem 1 shows that players’ preferences being quasi-intermediate is a sufficient
condition for the existence of Nash equilibria displaying behavioral conformity in
games with a continuum of players. In fact, every Nash equilibrium of such a game
can be modified in order to produce another Nash equilibrium that displays behavioral
conformity and induces the same distribution over actions as the original equilibrium.
This result means that every distribution on A induced by a Nash equilibrium is
consistent with behavioral conformity, and thus, the space of players can always
be partitioned into |A(f)| ≤ |A| societies. Furthermore, the existence of a Nash
equilibrium for this class of games (Schmeidler (1973); see also Khan and Sun (2002,
Theorem 2)), then implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium that displays strong
behavioral conformity.3
We consider also the case of games with a large, but finite, number of players.
Since we can understand games with a continuum of players as the limit of large finite
games (see, for example, Green (1984), Housman (1988) and Carmona (2004)), one
expects that properties that hold for Nash equilibria in games with a continuum of
players will also hold in approximate equilibria for large finite games. In fact, we use
Theorem 1 to establish the existence of approximate equilibria displaying behavioral
conformity in all sufficiently large finite games.
Corollary 1 Let G = (Ω, U, A) be a pregame such that U(Ω) is equicontinuous and
quasi-intermediate. Then, for all ε > 0 there is N ∈ N with the following property:
For all n ≥ N , every induced game Gn = (Tn, νn, α,Ω, U,A) with n players has
an ε – equilibrium that displays behavioral conformity.
We conclude this section by remarking that Corollary 1 allow us to generalize
3Note that Theorem 2 in Khan and Sun (2002) guarantees the existence of a strategy such that
almost all players best-reply. However, we can change it in a set of measure zero (and so in a
measurable way) if necessary in order to guarantee that all players best-reply.
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Theorem 3 in WCS. This follows because every pregame satisfying the large game,
within-type anonymity and linearity in taste types (as defined in WCS) defines a
pregame G = (Ω, U,A) that induces the same n-player games and such that U is
uniformly continuous and U(Ω) is quasi-intermediate and compact, hence equicon-
tinuous.4 Therefore, we can conclude from Corollary 1 that for all ε > 0 there is
N ∈ N such that every induced game Gn with n ≥ N players has an ε – equilibrium
that displays behavioral conformity. In conclusion, Corollary 1 extends Theorem 3
of WCS by allowing more general attribute spaces (Ω can be any convex, bounded,
measurable subset of RL) and more general preference functions (U needs only to be
measurable and such that U(Ω) is quasi-intermediate and equicontinuous).
4 Further Results and Proofs of the Main Results
In this section, we present additional results regarding a stronger notion of behavioral
conformity (Subsection 4.1) and explain how to extend Theorem 1 to the case where
attributes consist of a crowding type and a taste type (Subsection 4.2). Finally, in
Subsection 4.3, we provide the proof of Theorem 1 and of Corollary 1.
4.1 Strong Behavioral Conformity
The notion of behavioral conformity only imposes restrictions on the behavior of those
players that belong to the interior of a society. However, sometimes it is possible to
obtain a stronger behavioral conformity result, in the sense that all players in a
society, thus including those on its boundary, play the same action. As Theorem 2
below shows, a sufficient condition for this strong form of behavioral conformity is
for players’ attributes to be sufficiently dispersed.
4See the working paper version of this paper, Carmona (2007), for details.
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The notions of strong behavioral conformity and of a dispersed induced game are
formally defined as follows. An induced game G = (T, ϕ, α,Ω, U,A) is dispersed if the
probability measure ϕ◦α−1 on Ω is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. A pure strategy strategy f in an induced game G displays strong behavioral
conformity if there exists a partition of Ω into |A(f)| convex subsets {Ca}a∈A(f) such
that f−1(a) = α−1(Ca) for all a ∈ A(f).
Theorem 2 establishes that all dispersed induced games with a continuum of play-
ers and quasi-intermediate preferences have Nash equilibria displaying strong behav-
ioral conformity.5
Theorem 2 Let G = ([0, 1], `, α,Ω, U,A) be a dispersed induced game with a con-
tinuum of players such that U(Ω) is quasi-intermediate. Then there exists a Nash
equilibrium of G displaying strong behavioral conformity.
Theorem 2 can be used to obtain a similar result for games with a large, but
finite number of players. Such a result, Corollary 2 below, states that all sufficiently
large finite games with a one-dimensional attribute space and an injective attribute
function have an approximate equilibrium displaying strong behavioral conformity.
Corollary 2 Let G = (Ω, U, A) be a pregame such that Ω ⊆ R and U(Ω) is equicon-
tinuous and quasi-intermediate. Then, for all ε > 0 there is N ∈ N with the following
property:
For all n ≥ N , every injective induced game Gn = (Tn, νn, α,Ω, U, A) with n
players has an ε – equilibrium that displays strong behavioral conformity.
The assumption in Corollary 2 that the attribute function is injective plays a role
similar to that of the dispersed assumption in Theorem 2. In fact, both guarantee
that there is at most a “small number” of players with the same attribute.
5See the working paper version of this paper for a proof of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 below.
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4.2 Crowding Types
In this subsection, we consider the case where an attribute can be decomposed into a
crowding type and a taste type, as in WCS, and remark on how to extend Theorem
1 to the case of several crowding types.
Assume, as in WCS, that the attribute space equals C×Ω, where C = {c1, . . . , cm}
is interpreted as the set of crowding types and Ω as the set of taste types. In this
context, players care about the distribution of actions for every crowding type, and
so payoff functions are continuous functions v : A ×Mm → R. Letting V be the
space of all such functions, a pregame is now defined by the attribute space C ×Ω, a
measurable preference function U : C × Ω→ V , and the action space A.
As before, a pregame together with a measure space (T, ϕ) of players and a mea-
surable attribute function, which is now a function α : T → C×Ω, defines an induced
game. Clearly, the space of players can be partitioned into m measurable sets {Ti}mi=1
where Ti = α
−1({ci}×Ω), and, corresponding to each 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that ϕ(Ti) > 0,
we can define a measure ϕi by ϕi(B) = ϕ(B)/ϕ(Ti) for all measurable subsets B of
Ti. A strategy is still a measurable function f : T → A, but it is now decomposed
as f = (f1, . . . , fm) with fi : Ti → A. Finally, a strategy f is a Nash equilib-
rium in a game with a continuum of players if Uα(t)(f(t), ϕ1 ◦ f−11 , . . . , ϕm ◦ f−1m ) ≥
Uα(t)(a, ϕ1 ◦ f−11 , . . . , ϕm ◦ f−1m ) for all t ∈ T and a ∈ A.
In order to extend Theorem 1 to the case of several crowding types, all it takes
is to write Ωi = {ci} × Ω for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m and then apply the approach used in
its proof to each i = 1, . . . ,m separately. Since we obtain at most |A(fi)| ≤ |A|
societies for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, then an upper bound on the total number of societies is
m|A| = |C||A|. This is the same bound as in Theorem 3 in WCS.
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4.3 Proofs
The idea of the proof of Theorem 1 is illustrated by two examples. The first example
we consider is an induced game in which players are inhabitants of a city with two
bridges. Players’ preferences depend on how crowded each bridge is, although some
may have a bias toward one of the two bridges. Let the pregame be defined by
Ω = [0, 2], A = {b1, b2} and
Uω(a, µ) =
 1− µ1 if a = b1,ωµ1 if a = b2 (4)
for all ω ∈ [0, 2]. Thus, a player with attribute ω = 1 cares only about how crowded
each bridge is, whereas those with ω < 1 (resp ω > 1) have a bias toward bridge 1
(resp 2).
Let ([0, 1], `) be the set of players and α : [0, 1]→ Ω be defined by α(t) = 1 for all
t ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that if g is a Nash equilibrium of G, then ` ◦ g−1({b1}) = 1/2.
The way we can obtain a Nash equilibrium f satisfying behavioral conformity and
inducing the desired distribution over action is as follows. Let C1 = {ω ∈ Ω :
Uω(b1, `◦g−1) ≥ Uω(b2, `◦g−1)} = [0, 1] and C2 = {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(b2, `◦g−1) > Uω(b1, `◦
g−1)} = (1, 2]. Hence, one easily concludes that int(Ci) ⊆ {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(bi, ` ◦ g−1) >
Uω(bj, `◦g−1)} for all i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i. Hence, defining f(t) = ai if α(t) ∈ int(Ci),
we only need to divide the remaining players (i.e., those in [0, 1] \ α−1(∪2i=1int(Ci)))
between the two actions in such a way that ` ◦ f−1 = 1/2.
The conclusion that int(Ci) ⊆ {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(bi, ` ◦ g−1) > Uω(bj, ` ◦ g−1)} for all
i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i can be established in general using Lemma 1 below. It states
that for any pair of actions such that, for some attributes one action is preferred,
while for other attributes the two actions are indifferent, we can easily determine
whether a player with an attribute in the interior of Ω strictly prefers one action
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to the other or whether he is indifferent between them. In fact, we simply need to
determine the position of his attribute relative to a hyperplane. Despite the fact that
we assume that preferences are merely quasi-intermediate and the attribute space is
merely convex (but not necessarily open), this lemma can be proven using the same
argument as in the proof of the Proposition in Grandmont (1978) (and, therefore, its
proof is omitted). However, since we do not assume that Ω is open, our conclusions
apply only to points in the interior of Ω.
Lemma 1 Let a, a¯ ∈ A, µ ∈ M and suppose that Ω ⊆ RL is convex, U(Ω) is quasi-
intermediate and there exist ω˜, ωˆ ∈ Ω such that Uω˜(a, µ) > Uω˜(a¯, µ) and Uωˆ(a, µ) =
Uωˆ(a¯, µ).
Then, there exist q ∈ RL, q 6= 0, and c ∈ R such that for all ω ∈ int(Ω), q · ω > c
when Uω(a, µ) > Uω(a¯, µ), q · ω = c when Uω(a, µ) = Uω(a¯, µ), and q · ω < c when
Uω(a, µ) < Uω(a¯, µ).
The second example we consider is a trivial induced game in which all players are
indifferent between all actions. In this example, the pregame is defined by Ω = [0, 1],
A = {a1, a2} and Uω(a, µ) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω, a ∈ A and µ ∈ M. Let ([0, 1], `) be the
space of players and define
α(t) =

0 if t ∈ [0, 1/4],
8/10 if t ∈ (1/4, 1/2),
9/10 if t ∈ [1/2, 3/4) and
1 if t ∈ [3/4, 1]
(5)
Since players are indifferent between all actions, it follows that every strategy is
a Nash equilibrium. Suppose that g is a Nash equilibrium of this game such that
` ◦ g−1({a1}) = 2/3. Then, we can define C1 = [0, 9/10] and C2 = (9/10, 1]. The
important property guaranteed by this choice is that `◦α−1(int(C1)) = `((1/4, 1/2)) =
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1/4 < ` ◦ g−1({a1}) and ` ◦ α−1(int(C2)) = `(∅) = 0 < ` ◦ g−1({a2}). Hence, defining
f(t) = ai if α(t) ∈ int(Ci) for all i = 1, 2, we still leave f undefined in the set
[0, 1/4] ∪ [1/2, 1]. This set of players can then be divided in a way that those in it
playing a1 have a measure of 5/12 = `◦g−1({a1})− `◦α−1(int(C1)). For example, we
can define f(t) = a1 for all t ∈ [7/12, 1] and f(t) = a2 for all t ∈ [0, 1/4]∪ [1/2, 7/12].
More generally, we use the following lemma when there are several actions which
are indifferent for all players.
Lemma 2 Let C ⊆ RL be a bounded, measurable, convex set and c1, c2, . . . , ck ∈ R
be such that ci ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and λ(int(C)) ≤
∑k
i=1 ci ≤ λ(C).
Then, there exists a convex partition {Ci}ki=1 of C satisfying λ(int(Ci)) ≤ ci for
all i = 1, . . . , k.
We can use Lemma 2 in the above example by considering C = Ω, L = 1, c1 =
` ◦ g−1({a1}) = 2/3 and c2 = ` ◦ g−1({a2}) = 1/3.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let g be a Nash equilibrium of G. For convenience,
let τ = ` ◦ g−1 be the distribution over actions induced by g. By definition, we have
that τ({a}) = `({t ∈ T : g(t) = a}). We will use g to define a strategy f displaying
behavioral conformity such that ` ◦ f−1 = τ and f(t) solves maxa∈A Uα(t)(a, τ) for all
t ∈ [0, 1]. Clearly, the two last properties imply that f is a Nash equilibrium.
Define the following equivalence relation in A(g): a ∼ a′ if Uω(a, τ) = Uω(a′, τ)
for all ω ∈ Ω. Thus, action a is equivalent to a′ under ∼ if all players are indifferent
between a and a′ when the distribution is τ . Let Ai ⊆ A(g) be the set of actions
a ∈ A(g) for which there is a′ ∈ A(g), a′ 6= a, such that a ∼ a′ and, for every a ∈ A(g),
let [a] denote the equivalence class of action a. Thus, Ai is the set of actions a ∈ A(g)
such that [a] is not a singleton, or equivalently, A(g)\Ai is the set of actions a ∈ A(g)
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such that [a] = {a}.
Enumerate Ai and A(g) \ Ai and write A(g) \ Ai = {a1, . . . , ak} and Ai =
{ak+1, . . . , aM}.
For all a ∈ A(g), let i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} be such that a = ai and define
Ea =
(∩Mj=1{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai, τ) ≥ Uω(aj, τ)})∩
∩ (∩i−1j=1{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai, τ) > Uω(aj, τ)}) . (6)
Since both {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai, τ) ≥ Uω(a′, τ)} and {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai, τ) > Uω(a′, τ)} are
convex for all a′ ∈ A, then Ea is convex.
Let Ca = Ea for all a ∈ A(g) \ Ai. Note that if ai ∈ Ai and there aj ∼ ai with
j < i, then Eai = ∅. This is so because {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai, τ) > Uω(aj, τ)} = ∅. Due to
this, for all a ∈ Ai, define D[a] = Eai where i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} is the smallest index such
that ai ∈ [a]. Clearly, we have defined a convex partition {Ca}a∈A(g)\Ai ∪ {D[a]}a∈Ai
of Ω.
For all a ∈ A(g) \ Ai, define
Ba = ∩Mj=1{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a, τ) ≥ Uω(aj, τ)} (7)
and
Sa = ∩a′ 6=a{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a, τ) > Uω(a′, τ)}. (8)
The set Ba (resp. Sa) is the set of attributes for whom a is a (resp. the unique)
best-reply and so ` ◦α−1(Sa) ≤ τ({a}) ≤ ` ◦α−1(Ba). Similarly, for all a ∈ Ai, define
B[a] = ∩a′∈A{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a, τ) ≥ Uω(a′, τ)} and S[a] = ∩a′ 6∈[a]{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a, τ) >
Uω(a
′, τ)}. Since [a] = {a} for all a ∈ A(g) \Ai, we abuse notation and also write S[a]
(resp B[a]) for Sa (resp Ba).
We start by establishing a property of points in the interior of Ca and D[a], for
a ∈ A(g) \ Ai and a ∈ Ai respectively.
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Let a ∈ A(g)\Ai and ω ∈ int(Ca). Then, Uω(a, τ) > Uω(a¯, τ) for all a¯ ∈ A, a¯ 6= a,
i.e., int(Ca) ⊆ Sa. In fact, suppose, in order to reach a contradiction, that Uω(a, τ) =
Uω(a¯, τ). Since a 6∼ a¯, then there exists ωˆ ∈ Ω such that either Uωˆ(a, τ) > Uωˆ(a¯, τ) or
Uωˆ(a¯, τ) > Uωˆ(a, τ). In both cases, it follows from Lemma 1 that there exist q ∈ RL,
q 6= 0 and c ∈ R such that for all ω¯ ∈ int(Ω), q · ω¯ > c if Uω¯(a, τ) > Uω¯(a¯, τ), q · ω¯ = c
if Uω¯(a, τ) = Uω¯(a¯, τ) and q · ω¯ < c if Uω¯(a, τ) < Uω¯(a¯, τ). Since ω ∈ int(Ca) ⊆ int(Ω),
then q · ω = c and so there exists ω¯ ∈ int(Ca) such that q · ω¯ < c. This implies that
Uω¯(a, τ) < Uω¯(a¯, τ), a contradiction to ω¯ ∈ Ca.
In this case, define
f(t) = a if α(t) ∈ int(Ca). (9)
Since int(Ca) ⊆ Sa, then ` ◦ α−1(int(Ca)) ≤ ` ◦ g−1({a}).
We now turn to actions in Ai. Let a¯ ∈ Ai. A similar argument to the one above
shows that if ω ∈ int(D[a¯]), then ω ∈ S[a¯]. Hence, defining
ca = `({t ∈ [0, 1] : α(t) ∈ S[a¯] and g(t) = a}) (10)
for all a ∈ [a¯], it follows that
` ◦ α−1(int(D[a¯])) ≤ ` ◦ α−1(S[a¯]) =
∑
a∈[a¯]
ca ≤ ` ◦ α−1(D[a¯]). (11)
By Lemma 2, there exists a convex partition {Ca}a∈[a¯] of D[a¯] such that ` ◦
α−1(int(Ca)) ≤ ca. Define, again, f(t) = a if α(t) ∈ int(Ca) and note that ` ◦
α−1(int(Ca)) ≤ ` ◦ g−1({a}) since ca ≤ ` ◦ g−1({a}).
Since Ω =
(∪a∈A(g)\AiCa) ∪ (∪a∈AiD[a]) = ∪a∈A(g)Ca, Ca is convex and f(t) = a if
α(t) ∈ int(Ca) for all a ∈ A(g), {Ca}a∈A(g) is our desired convex partition.
To complete the proof, we need to specify f on Ω\∪a∈A(g)int(Ca) so that `◦f−1 =
` ◦ g−1. This will follow from the Bolloba´s-Varopoulos Theorem (see Khan and Sun
(1995, Theorem 4)). Indeed, define Z = [0, 1] \ α−1(∪aint(Ca)), Ta = ∩a′∈A{t ∈
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Z : Uα(t)(a, τ) ≥ Uα(t)(a′, τ)} = α−1(B[a] \ ∪a′ int(Ca′)) and θa = ` ◦ g−1({a}) − ` ◦
α−1(int(Ca)) ≥ 0. Since we have that `(∪a∈BTa) ≥
∑
a∈B θa for all (finite) subsets
B of A, it follows that there exists a disjoint family of measurable sets {Fa}a∈A such
that Fa ⊆ Ta and `(Fa) = θa for all a ∈ A. Thus, define f(t) = a if t ∈ Fa. Hence, f
is a Nash equilibrium of G displaying behavioral conformity.
Theorem 1 is the main tool for establishing Corollary 1. The reason is that we
associate, to a game Gn with n players, a game with a continuum of players that
induces the same distribution over the attribute space and use Theorem 1 to find a
Nash equilibrium (of the game with a continuum of players) displaying behavioral
conformity. This Nash equilibrium, together with the fact that both games have the
same distribution over attributes, is then used to obtain an approximate equilibrium
of Gn displaying behavioral conformity.
Note that in a game with finitely many players, each of them has an impact
on the distribution over action. Thus, the above argument requires the following
lemma, which shows that in large games a player deviation has a small impact on the
distribution of actions.
Lemma 3 Let Gn = (Tn, νn, α,Ω, U,A) be an induced game with n players and let
f : Tn → A be a strategy. Then,
||νn ◦ f−1 − νn ◦ (f \t a)−1|| ≤ 1
n
, (12)
for all t ∈ Tn and a ∈ A.
We finally turn to the proof of Corollary 1.
Proof of Corollary 1. Let ε > 0. Since U(Ω) is equicontinuous, let δ > 0 be
such that
||Uω(a, τ)− Uω(a, µ)|| < ε/2 (13)
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whenever ||τ − µ|| < δ, τ, µ ∈M, a ∈ A and ω ∈ Ω. Finally, let N ∈ N be such that
|A|/n < δ/2 whenever n ≥ N .
Let n ≥ N and Gn = (Tn, νn, α,Ω, U, A) be an induced game with n players.
Define I1 = [0, 1/n], Ii = ((i− 1)/n, i/n] for all i = 2, . . . , n and consider the induced
game G˜ = ([0, 1], `, α˜,Ω, U, A) defined by α˜(t) = α(i) if t ∈ Ii. That is, players t ∈ I1
have payoff function Uα(1), players t ∈ I2 have payoff function Uα(2), and so on. Then,
G˜ has a Nash equilibrium f displaying behavioral conformity by Theorem 1. Let
{a1, . . . , aK} = A(f) and {Ck}Kk=1 be such that α(t) ∈ int(Ck) implies that f(t) = ak.
For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ K, let τi,j = `({t ∈ Ii : f(t) = aj}) and
τj =
∑n
i=1 τi,j for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The equilibrium distribution can be
represented in the following way:
τ1,1 τ1,2 · · · τ1,K
τ2,1 τ2,2 τ2,K
...
τn,1 τn,2 τn,K
τ1 τ2 τK
Note that
∑K
j=1 τi,j = 1/n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Furthermore, since f is a Nash equilib-
rium, τi,j > 0 implies that
Uα(i)(aj, ` ◦ f−1) ≥ Uα(i)(a, ` ◦ f−1) (14)
for all a ∈ A.
Let E = {e1, . . . , eK} denote the standard basis of RK and define
Si =
{
1
n
ej : τi,j > 0
}
. (15)
Then, we have that (τi,1, . . . , τi,K) ∈ co(Si) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, since
(τi,1, . . . , τi,K) =
∑
j:τi,j>0
τi,jej =
∑
j:τi,j>0
nτi,j
ej
n
, (16)
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nτi,j ≥ 0 for all j and
∑
j:τi,j>0
nτi,j = 1. This implies that
(τ1, . . . , τK) ∈ co
(
n∑
i=1
Si
)
=
n∑
i=1
co(Si), (17)
and so by the Shapley-Folkman Theorem (see Rashid (1983)), it follows that there
are n points (αi,1, . . . , αi,K) ∈ co(Si), i = 1, . . . , n, such that
(τ1, . . . , τK) =
n∑
i=1
(αi,1, . . . , αi,K) (18)
and
|{i : (αi,1, . . . , αi,K) 6∈ Si}| ≤ K = |A(f)|. (19)
Let P = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : nαi ∈ E}. Define a pure strategy g as follows: if
i ∈ P , let ej be such that nαi = ej and define g(i) = aj; if i 6∈ P , choose 1 ≤ j ≤ K
such that τi,j > 0 and define g(i) = aj. It then follows from inequality (14) that
Uα(i)(g(i), ` ◦ f−1) ≥ Uα(i)(a, ` ◦ f−1) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a ∈ A.
It follows by construction that g displays behavioral conformity. Indeed, if i ∈
{1, . . . , n} is such that α(i) ∈ int(Cj) for some 1 ≤ j ≤ K, then for all t ∈ Ii,
α˜(t) = α(i) ∈ int(Cj). Therefore, f(t) = aj for all t ∈ Ii and so τi,j = 1. Hence,
Si = co(Si) = {ej/n}, nαi = ej and g(i) = aj. In conclusion, if i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is such
that α(i) ∈ int(Cj), then g(i) = aj.
Let 1 ≤ j ≤ K and let 1{g=aj} : {1, . . . , n} → {0, 1} denote the function defined
by 1{g=aj}(i) = 1 if g(i) = aj and 1{g=aj} = 0 if g(i) 6= aj. Then we can write
νn ◦ g−1(aj) =
∑
i∈P
αi,j +
1
n
∑
i 6∈P
1{g=aj}(i). (20)
Hence,
|` ◦ f−1(aj)− νn ◦ g−1(aj)| = 1
n
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i6∈P
(
nαi,j − 1{g=aj}(i)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Kn (21)
and so ||` ◦ f−1 − νn ◦ g−1|| ≤ K/n < δ/2.
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By Lemma 3, it follows that
||` ◦ f−1 − νn ◦ (g−1 \i a)|| ≤ ||` ◦ f−1 − νn ◦ g−1||+ ||νn ◦ g−1 − νn ◦ (g−1 \i a)||
≤ δ
2
+
1
n
< δ,
(22)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a ∈ A.
Hence, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a ∈ A, we obtain
Uα(i)(g(i), νn ◦ g−1) > Uα(i)(g(i), ` ◦ f−1)− ε
2
≥ Uα(i)(a, ` ◦ f−1)− ε
2
> Uα(i)(a, νn ◦ (g−1 \i a))− ε.
(23)
Therefore, g is a ε – equilibrium of Gn.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have approached the behavioral conformity problem of WCS using
the framework of games with a continuum of players. This has led to some improve-
ments of their Theorem 3, not only in terms of weakening some of its assumptions,
but also in terms of a simpler proof, able to accommodate easily the case of multi-
dimensional attributes and arbitrary finite action spaces.
Although artificial, the case of a continuum of players is interesting even for some-
one who is only interested in games with a large but finite number of players. In fact,
as we have shown in Carmona (2004), the limit points of the approximate equilibria
of large finite games correspond to the Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of
players. In this paper, this correspondence between Nash equilibria of games with a
continuum of players and approximate equilibria of games with a large, finite num-
ber of players was precisely the tool we used to derive our generalization of WCS’s
Theorem 3 from our Theorem 1 pertaining to games with a continuum of players.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. Note that if λ(C) = 0, then we can let C1 = C and Ci = ∅ for
all i = 2, . . . , k. Also, if ci = 0 for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then we can let Ci = ∅. Therefore,
we may assume that ci > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , k.
Let x 6∈ C. By the supporting hyperplane theorem, let p ∈ RL be such that p 6= 0
and p · y ≤ p · x for all y ∈ C. Let d = p · x+ 1.
For all η ∈ R+, define
Cη = C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d− η ≤ p · z ≤ d} (24)
and define a function m : R+ → R+ by m(η) = λ(Cη).
One easily establishes the following properties of m: (1) m is increasing, (2)
limη↓η∗m(η) = m(η∗) for all η∗, (3) limη↑η∗m(η) = λ(C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d − η∗ <
p · z ≤ d}) for all η∗ and (4) m(0) = 0. Note that property 2 means that m is upper
semicontinuous. Since C is bounded let η¯ > 0 be such that Cη¯ = C. Therefore,
m(η) = λ(C) for all η ≥ η¯.
We will define C1 = C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d− η1 ≤ p · z ≤ d} and
Ci = C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d− ηi ≤ p · z < d− ηi−1} (25)
for all i = 2, . . . , k, where η1, . . . , ηk are chosen so that 0 < η1 ≤ . . . ≤ ηk, C = ∪ki=1Ci,
λ(int(Ci)) ≤ ci for all i = 1, . . . , k and λ(∪ni=1Ci) ≥
∑n
i=1 ci for all 1 ≤ n ≤ k. Our
task is to show the existence of such η1, . . . , ηk.
Note that if z ∈ C, then p · z ≤ p · x < p · x+ 1 = d; hence, letting η0 = 0, we can
write C1 = C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d− η1 ≤ p · z < d− η0}.
For all j = 1, . . . , k− 1, define ηj = min{η : m(η) ≥
∑j
i=1 cj}. Note that ηj is well
defined since {η : m(η) ≥∑ji=1 cj} is closed and nonempty; in fact, the first property
follows because m is upper semicontinuous, while the second follows from the fact
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that η¯ ∈ {η : m(η) ≥ ∑ji=1 cj}. Finally, define ηk = η¯ ≥ min{η : m(η) ≥ ∑ki=1 cj}.
For convenience, let ηˆk = min{η : m(η) ≥
∑k
i=1 cj}.
Since c1 > 0 and {η : m(η) ≥
∑j+1
i=1 cj} ⊆ {η : m(η) ≥
∑j
i=1 cj}, it follows that
η1 > 0 and ηj ≤ ηj+1 for all j = 1, . . . , k − 2. Also, ηk−1 ≤ ηˆk ≤ ηk, and so the
inequality ηj ≤ ηj+1 holds for all j = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Since ∪ni=1Ci = Cηn it follows that λ(∪ni=1Ci) = λ(Cηn) = m(ηn) ≥
∑n
i=1 ci for all
1 ≤ n ≤ k. Furthermore, ∪ki=1Ci = Cηk = C.
We next show that λ(int(Ci)) ≤ ci for all i = 1, . . . , k. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ k. If ηi = ηi−1,
then Ci = ∅ and so the conclusion follows. Therefore, we may assume that ηi > ηi−1.
In this case, it follows that
int(Ci) = int(C) ∩ int({z ∈ RL : d− ηi ≤ p · z < d− ηi−1})
= int(C) ∩ {z ∈ RL : d− ηi < p · z < d− ηi−1}
⊆ int(C) ∩ (C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d− ηi < p · z ≤ d} \ ∪i−1j=1Cj) .
(26)
Therefore, if i ≤ k − 1, then ηi = min{η : m(η) ≥
∑i
j=1 cj} and so m(η) <
∑i
j=1 cj
for all η < ηi. Thus, limη↑ηi m(η) ≤
∑i
j=1 cj and so
λ(int(Ci)) ≤ lim
η↑ηi
m(η)− λ(∪i−1j=1Cj) ≤
i∑
j=1
cj −
i−1∑
j=1
cj = ci. (27)
If i = k, then
λ(int(Ck)) ≤ λ(int(C))− λ(∪k−1j=1Cj) ≤
k∑
j=1
cj −
k−1∑
j=1
cj = ck. (28)
In conclusion, λ(int(Ci)) ≤ ci for all i = 1, . . . , k.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let t ∈ Tn and a ∈ A. Let τ = νn ◦ f−1, µ = νn ◦ (f \t a)−1
and a¯ = f(t). If a¯ = a, then τ = µ. If a¯ 6= a, then |τ({a˜})− µ({a˜})| = 0 if a˜ 6= a and
a˜ 6= a¯, while |τ({a˜})− µ({a˜})| = 1/n otherwise, and so ||τ − µ|| = 1/n.
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